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COMMENTS
EFFECT OF VERDICT FOR EMPLOYEE
IN JOINT ACTION AGAINST
EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE
The recent decision in the case of Moffett v. McCurry,' decided by a full bench of the Court of Appeals of Georgia, brings
to mind the question presented by this comment. That is, what
is the effect of a verdict in favor of the employee in a joint
action against the employer and employee?
In considering this problem, there are actually two different
answers, both of which are followed by a majority of the jurisdictions in the United States. And these two solutions are not
inconsistent, but are rather in harmony, one applying under
one situation of facts and the other under a different situation
of facts.
The first rule is that where the negligence upon which the
action against the employer is based is purely derivative, falling
under what is commonly known as the doctrine of respondeat
superior, a verdict exonerating the employee but holding the
employer liable cannot be the basis of a judgment against the
employer, but must be set aside. This is upon the theory that
the sole basis of liability of the employer is the negligence or
wrongdoing of the employee imputed to the employer under the
doctrine of respondeat superior and the acquittal of the employee
of no wrongdoing conclusively negatives liability of the employer.
The verdict in favor of the employee, determining in effect that
he was not guilty of negligence, necessarily amounts to a finding
that the employer was free from negligence, and a verdict
against the employer after finding in favor of the employee
would be inconsistent and illogical.'
It will be seen later in this discussion that a few courts refused to apply this logically-appealing theory at one time in
their history, but it always represented the opinion of an overwhelming majority of the courts of the United States. Today
its acceptance has become almost unanimous, contrary authority in a number of former minority jurisdictions having been expressly overruled.
The other answer to the question put forth in the beginning
of this paper applies when the facts under which the master is
sued are found to be different. If the joint action against the
employer and employee is based, not on the negligence of this
employee alone, but rather on the negligence of the master
individually or the negligence of another employee not joined,
1. 84 Ga. App. 853, 67 S.E.2d 807 (1951).
2. 35 AM. JUR. 962, Master and Servant, § 534. 57 C.J.S. 421, Master and

Servant, § 619b.
(298)
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a verdict for the employee joined in the action would not in
itself be inconsistent with a verdict against the employer. The
jury could very properly find in such a situation that the injuries of the plaintiff were a result, not of the negligence of
the employee joined in the action, but of the negligence of the
master himself or of another servant; and the master would,
of course, be held liable under the doctrine or respondeat superior f9r the results of the negligence of another of his servants.3
Therefore, the answer as to which rule will apply as to the
employer's liability when a verdict is returned for the employee
turns on a question of fact. Was the injury a result of this employee's negligence alone? If so, the first principle mentioned
will apply in practically every case. If not, the second principle
will always apply.
The examination of this problem in closer detail requires
consideration of two distinctly separate questions, one a question of law and one a question of fact. The question of law will
make up the bulk of this comment. It involves a study of the
cases from the majority jurisdictions and also from those jurisdictions which have at one time refused to follow the first
majority rule discussed herein, which holds that where the
negligence of the employer is solely derivative and based on
respondeat superior, a verdict for the employee means that the
employer cannot be held liable. The question of fact, on the
other hand, involves a determination of just when the courts
will say that the facts are such that the second rule should apply
rather than the first, and the master can be held liable while the
particular servant joined is relieved of liability.
The Georgia case mentioned in the introduction to this comment falls under the latter question and will be discussed later.
As to the former question, Georgia has always followed the
majority rule. In the early landmark case of Southern Railway
Coinpany v. Harbin4 the court made this plain:
In an action against a railway company and its servant, to recover damages for the homicide of the plaintiff's son solely in con-

sequence of the servant's misfeasance, where a verdict is returned
finding the servant not liable but findingx in favor of the plaintiff
against the railway company, such verdict should be set aside and
a new trial granted.

Other Georgia cases, where this proposition has been followed, are numerous and convince the writer that once a court
in Georgia decides that the master's negligence is derived
through respondeat superior solely from the negligence of the
3. Ibid.
4. 135 Ga. 122, 68 S.E. 1103 (1910).
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servant joined, the law of the Harbin case will control.'
The decisions applying this principle are quite numerous and
there have been some excellent annotations involving this point.'
One of the earliest cases laying down the principle was Montfort v. Hughes,7 decided by the Court of Common Pleas for
the City and County of New York in 1954. Sarah Montfort was
suing James Hughes and two others for injuries occasioned by
the actions of Wild, servant of Hughes and the other party,
both of whom were not present when the injuries occurred. The
court said:
If he (the servant) was not zuiltv of negligence, no one of the
defendants was responsible to the plaintiff . . To acquit him and
inquire further whether the plaintiff should have judgment against
his masters was utterly contradictory ... 8

Another of the leading cases on this point is Dorenus v.
Root,' decided by the Washington Supreme Court in

19oi.

In

this case Doremus sued Root, the conductor, and the Oregon
Railroad and Navigation Company for alleged injuries caused
by Root's negligence. The jury decided against the company
but was silent as to the conductor, and the court ruled that
this was a verdict in his favor.
This ruling itself might be the subject of further study, but
it will not be considered in this paper. Also involved are questions concerning procedure: whether there should be a new trial
as to both defendants, whether the case should be remanded
and a final judgment entered in favor of the employer, and
many others. However, this paper is not concerned with procedure, but simply whether the courts have allowed a verdict for
the employee and against the employer to stand. The overwhelming majority do not allow such a verdict to stand; what
they do procedurally when they reverse will not be examined
in this brief study.
To continue, the Washington court said that such a verdict
could not be the basis of a judgment against the company. If
the employee who caused the injury was free from liability
therefor, his employer must also be free from liability. To the
5.

6.
7,
8.
9.

See Salmon v. Southern Ry. Co.. 137 Ga. 636, 73 S.E. 1062 (1912)
Southern Ry. Co. v. Davenport, 39 Ga. App 645, 148 S.E. 171 (1929);
Roadway Express v. McBroom, 61 Ga. App. 223. 6 S.E.2d 460 (1939)
Southern Ry. Co. v. Nix, 62 Ga. App. 119, 8 S.E.2d 409 (1940) ; Kalil
v. Spivey, 70 Ga. App. 84. 27 S.E.2d 475 (1943) ; Dixie Ohio Express
Co. v. Poston. 170 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1948).
See Notes, 9 Ann. Cas. 660 (1908), 21 Ann. Cas. 1013 (1911), 54 L.R.A.
649 (1902), 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 880 (1907), 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 404 (1911),
L.R.A. 1917E, 1029, 78 A.L.R. 365 (1932), 16 A.L.R.2d 969 (1951).
3 E. D. Smith 591 (N.Y. 1854).
Id. at 594.
23 Wash. 710, 63 Pac. 572 (1901).
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same effect are the holdings in six other leading railway cases."
This rule has not been limited in its application to verdicts
in actions against railroads and their employees, although it
must be admitted that most of the early cases where it developed
were these type cases, as demonstrated above. As a practical
explanation, it was natural for the law to develop from railroad
litigation, since the railroads greatly antedated motor transport carriers and automobiles, which have today become the
cases in which many verdicts such as this are returned.
Other factual situations in which the majority rule has been
applied are very numerous" and the following cases constitute
a sampling selected practically at random, the only conscious
direction being toward as much variety as possible. In the
cases cited it must be remembered that the procedural results
vary from new trial to reversal with order for final judgment
for the employer. However, this comment is not directed toward
the procedural question, but rather toward the substantive
holdings of the following cases cited: that a verdict for an
employee and against an employer derivatively liable under
respondeat superior will not be allowed to stand.
Indiana: Suit against servant and blasting company for injuries caused by negligence of servant in "shooting" of a gas
well by nitroglycerin. 2
Tenncssee: Suit against servants (president and superintendent) and mercantile corporation for false imprisonment, assault
and battery, and slander by servants."
Firqinia: Suit against driver-employee and sight-seeing corporation for injuries resulting from collision of bus driven by
individual employee with an automobile. 4

Illinois: Suit against instructor-manager-employee and flying
school corporation
for wrongful death resulting from flight
5
with instructor.'
10. New Orleans & N. R. Co. v. Jopes. 142 U.S. 18, 12 S.Ct. 109. 35 L. Ed.
919 (1891); Stevick v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.. 39 Wash. 501, 81 Pac.
999 (1905); McGinnis v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 200 Mo. 347. 9,R
S.W. 590 (1906); Hobbs v. Illinois C. R. Co., 171 Iowa 624. 152 N.W.
40 (1915) ; Williams v. Hines, 80 Fla. 690. 86 So. 695 (1920) ; Willy v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 115 Colo. 306, 172 P.2d 958 (1946).

11.

12.
13.
14.
15.

See AMERICAN DIGEST SYSTEM: Master anld Servant, Key Nambcr 333;

Automobiles, Key Numbers 247 and 248.
Indiana Nitroglycerine & T. Co. v. Lippencott Glass Co., 165 Ind. 361,
75 N.E. 649 (1905).
D. B. Loveman Co. v. Bayless, 128 Tenn. 307, 160 S.W. 841 (1913).
Monumental Motor Tours v. Eaton, 184 Va. 311.35 S.E.2d 105 (1945).
Rogina v. Midwest Flying Service, 325 Il1. App. 588, 60 N.E.2d 663
(1945).
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Missouri: Suit against driver-employee and delivery company
for injuries in accident with truck driven by employee."
Minnesota: Suit against driver-employee and bus company
for injuries to passenger resulting from negligence of driver."
Oklahoina: Suit against servant and utility company for
personal injuries caused by negligent act of servant in repairing
burners of gas furnace."8
California: Suit against servant and telephone company for
personal injury resulting from negligence of servant."
New York: A very similar New York case involving the same
principle was Bourcier v. Peryor,2 ' a suit for personal injuries
against the driver of an automobile and the owner, the only
negligence being that of the driver. A verdict against the owner
and for the driver was set aside.
Having examined a broad sampling of cases from jurisdictions
applying the majority rule, we turn to a consideration of those
jurisdictions which have excepted.
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Murphy's Adm'r., decided by the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky in 19o6, was the case most frequently cited as representing the law of the minority until it
was reversed. This decision, as did the early decisions applying
the majority rule, arose out of an action against a railroad and
the engineer-employee. The verdict was against the railroad
and silent as to the engineer, thereby relieving him from liability. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed in this oft-quoted
language of minority decisions and annotations:
It does not follow that the same verdict need have been rendered
against the company and its engineer. We can think of cases where
possibly the engineer ought to be held to the stricter account, and
vice versa; but let that be as it may, if the plaintiff is entitled to
his verdict against two tortfeasors, but the jury are able to agree
only as to one of them, and gives a verdict accordingly, we know
of no law that prevents the plaintiff from having at least what the
jury has given him. If he failed to get the verdict against another
also liable, the plaiTtiff may be aggriev)ed, but jvot the defcndant
IItalics supplied1 .22

The above statement expresses the feeling of most courts
which have refused to follow the majority rule. Without deny16. Berger v. Podolsky Bros., 360 Mo. 239, 227 S.W.2d 695 (1950).
17. Begin v. Liederbach Bus Co., 167 Minn. 84, 208 N.W. 546 (1926).
18. Consolidated Gas Utilities Co. v. Beatie, 167 Okla. 71, 27 P.2d 813
(1933).
19. Bradley v. Rosenthal, 154 Cal. 420, 97 Pac. 875 (1908).
20. 293 N.Y. 806, 59 N.E.2d 175 (1944).
21. 123 Ky. 787, 97 S.W. 729 (1906).
22. Id., 97 S.W. at 732.
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ing their illogical position in allowing the person derivatively
liable to be held responsible while releasing the person primarily
liable, they have adopted a view which is most advantageous to
the plaintiff and disastrous to the defendant master. In actual
practice, the master is undoubtedly the person who bears the
brunt of the damage in nine cases out of ten, but at least he
ought to have the protection of a requirement that the jury
find the servant negligent before holding him to answer. Kentucky continued to follow the rule laid down above in a number of decisions.' So fixed had this rule become in Kentucky
practice that it was determined in one opinion that "the question
may be treated as at rest ' 21 ' and in another that it was "our final
conclusion. 25
However, as is so often true, especially in the field of law, no
conclusions are final and no questions are ever completely at
rest. Therefore, in another Illinois Central Railroad case thirty
years later, in which the verdict below was the same as in the
Murphy case, we find the Kentucky Court of Appeals, perhaps
in response to the argument of more persuasive and logical defense counsel, speaking thusly:
The rule I of the lurphy case] was based on the theory that the
master and servant were joint tortfeasors. The theory, of course,
was erroneous. The master's liability rests upon the doctrine of
respondeat superior, and, unless nee'ligence on the part of
the
2
servant is shown, a recovery against the master cannot be had. "

With this decision Kentucky came into line with the majority
and has consistently followed the majority rule since that date. 7
The Supreme Court of Montana followed the reasoning of
the Murphy case in I91i in the case of Verlinda v. Stone &
Webster Eng. Co. 2' The action was for injuries suffered by one
servant in construction of a dam due to the negligence of a
fellow servant, and the verdict was against the company and
silent as to the servant sued jointly, thereby relieving him of
liability. The court, while recognizing the majority rule and
23.

24.
25.
26.
27.

28.

See Broadway Coal Mining Co, v. Robinson, 150 Ky. 707, 150 S.W.
1000 (1912) ; Weil v. Hagan, 166 Ky. 750, 179 S.W. 835 (1915) ; J. I.
Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Haynes, 178 Ky. 644, 199 S.W. 786 (1918) ;
Myers' Adm'x v. Brown, 250 Ky. 64, 61 S.W.2d 1052 (1933) ; Nashville,
C. & St. L. Ry. v. Byars, 252 Ky. 507, 67 S.W.2d 497 (1933).
Id., 179 S.W. at 836.
Id., 67 S.W.2d at 498.
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Applegate's Adm'x, 268 Ky. 458, 105 S.W.2d 153
1936).
See Blue Valley Creamery Co. v. Cronimus, 270 Ky. 496, 110 S.W.2d
286 (1937); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Farney, 295 Ky. 8, 172 S.W.2d
656 (1943) ; Dillion v. Harkeroad, 295 Ky. 308, 174 S.W.2d 419 (1943) ;
Lyons v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 301 Ky. 827, 193 S.W.2d 450
(1946).
44 Mont. 223, 119 Pac. 573 (1911).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

I Vol. 3

citing Dorcmnus v. Root, expressed a preference for the decision
in the Murphy case:
The conclusions reached by jurors are sometimes inexplicable.
Often they arbitrarily find against one party and in favor of an-

other without any apparent reason; but, if the evidence justifies

the verdict as to the party held, there is no reason why it should
not be deemed good as to him, notwithstanding there is no finding
as to the other.
It seems to us that the better rule is that, if the evidence is
such that the jury might have found against both the master and
the servant, the plaintiff should not be denied his recovery against
the master because the jury were unable to agree upon a verdict
against the servant, or arbitrarily disregarded the evidence tending to show negligence on the part of the servant.29

This decision was followed in Montana in the cases of Melznet" v. Ravcen Copper Co."" and DeSandro v. Missoula Light and
Jl"ater Co. :" Howevcr, only eleven years after the Jerlinda case,
the Montana court rejected its reasoning in the decision of
Lowner v.Butie Eleciric Rv. Co.3 2 It was there decided that the
language of the J/erlinda case and those following it was dicta,
and the decisions could be distinguished. Thereafter, Montana
became an adherent of the majority rule, holding that "a verdict exonerating the ' conductor while finding against the company is inconsistent.' 3
Thus far we have seen two courts, which at one time followed
the minority rule in no uncertain terms, unequivocally depart
from their earlier holdings.
In Texas the result is not so clear, and it can probably be
said that Texas is still in the minority camp. In the early case of
Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. James,"4 the court apparently followed what we have called the minority rule, but seemed to
indicate that its application would be limited to "that class of
torts characterized by the existence of a wrongful intent, as
distinguished from torts arising from negligence.""5 The action
was for malicious prosecution, and the defendants were the
railroad and its manager and assistant. A verdict being returned
against the railroad and silent as to the co-defendants, the court
allowed it to stand, saying:
It may be admitted, we think, that for the reason assigned the
verdict is not altogether consistent, and it may be said to be contradictory; but it does not follow that this alone will be sufficient
to impair or destroy the validity... :6

Then the court applied the limitation mentioned above.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id., 119 Pac. at 578.
47 Mont. 351, 132 Pac. 553 (1913).
48 Mont. 226,136 Pac. 711 (1913).
61 Mont. 497, 204 Pac. 485 (1922).
Ibid.
73 Tex. 12, 10 S.W. 744 (1889).
Id., 10 S.W. at 746.
Ibid.
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However, this limitation was completely overlooked by the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals in the case of Texas & P. Ry. Co.
v. Huber."' This was an action against the railroad and engineer
for wrongful death caused by the engineer's negligence, and the
jury found for the servant and against the company. Consider
this headnote in the Iuber opinion:
In an action against a railway company and its engineer for the
death of a pedestrian struck by an engine, the jury found a verdict
in favor of the engineer and against the railway company. Held
that, though the verdict had the appearance of being based on
contradictory findings because of a finding in favor of the engineer whose act constituted the negligence complained of, the verdict against the company would not be disturbed. ::"

Apparently the court just decided to disregard the jury's
plain verdict exonerating the engineer and rely on the verdict
against the railroad as indicating a finding of negligence, even
though the person responsible was released.
A fairly recent case resulting in the same decision held:
In an action for injuries to customer slipping on floor of store,
brought against both store owner and porter, who allegedly applied
floor dressing, fact that no judgment was rendered against porter
did not establish that porter was not guilty of negligence in applying floor dressing, so as to have required trial court to render
judgment in favor of store owner. ' 9

The language quoted previously from the Huber case was
also included in the opinion, indicating apparently that the
minority rule will still be applied in Texas.
The state of Idaho must also be counted among the minority
jurisdictions in view of the decision in Strickfaden L. Green
Creek Highway Dist.," which has been followed consistently
by the Idaho courts. The case involved for the most part many
technical municipal-corporation-law problems, and the masterservant question was mentioned only at the very end of the
opinion. However, the sweeping language of the opinion embraces and adopts with approval the minority decisions already mentioned in the states of Kentucky, Montana and Texas.
Having sued the Highway District and the director for injuries
resulting from negligence arising under the director's control,
the verdict was against the district only. On appeal, the court
affirmed in this language:
The verdict of a jury can only he set aside on appeal for want
of substantial evidence to support that particular verdict, and not
because the verdict may seem inconsistent with another verdict.
or because another verdict is wrong, or some other party has been
37. 95 S.W. 568 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906).
38. Id., 95 S.W. at 570.
39. S. H. Kress & Co. v. Hall, 154 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
40. 42 Idaho 738, 248 Pac. 456 (1926).
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discharged or exonerated. It would be a subversion of the ends of
justice to allow a defendant to complain of a just judgment against
it-one supported by the overwhelming weight of evidence-because its joint tortfeasor was not also held. Again, if it be contended by appellant that the verdicts are inconsistent, and one of
them is therefore capricious, or the result of prejudice, what more
reason is there for believing that the caprice or prejudice was
directed against the appellant than to suppose that it was directed
in favor of Dasenbrock and against respondent?4 1

The fallacy of the court's reasoning lies in the mistaken assumption that the master and servant are joint tortfeasors,
even where the liability of the master is based solely on the
negligence of the servant joined. But this error was not perceived, and again in the case of Judd v. Oregon Short Line Ry.
Co.4 " the same mistake was repeated. The railroad and engineer
were sued jointly, and the verdict was for one dollar against
the engineer and $15,72o against the railroad. The court said:
Appellant assigns as error the action of the court in submitting
to the jury two forms of verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and in
receiving from the jury separate verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs
and against defendants; one against the defendant Clinkingbeard
for one dollar, and the other against the railroad company for
$15,720. Clinkingbeard did not appeal. The railroad company appealed, and inter alia urges that the verdicts are inconsistent and
"make fish of one and fowl of the other."
The defendants were sued as joint tortfeasors. Clinkingbeard
was the engineer operating the locomotive and for that purpose,
of course, was the agent of the railroad company. Although the
jury found that the engineer was guilty of negligence, it is not
at all surprising if they concluded that, since what he was doing
was for the master and could not profit him in any way beyond his
wages, it would be only fair for his employer to pay whatever
damages had resulted from the negligent acts committed. This objection affords no grounds for disturbing a verdict returned against
either of the tortfeasors.4 3

Two recent Federal decisions applying Idaho law confirm
the fact that Idaho is still one of the very few state not following the majority rule.4
As to South Carolina, there also appears to be some indication in early opinions that their courts would apply the minority
rule. The case of Gardner v. Southern Ry. Co." has been cited
as being in point. It was held:
Where, in an action for personal injuries, the complaint alleges
that plaintiff was injured by the willful tort and negligence of the
master and of a servant, it is error to charge that there must be
a verdict for defendants46 if the jury found that the servant was
not guilty of negligence.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id., 248 Pac. at 465.
55 Idaho 461, 44 P.2d 291 (1935).
Id. 44 P.2d at 298.
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Newby, 153 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1946);
Browder v. Cook, 59 F. Supp. 675 (D. Idaho 1945).
45. 65 S.C. 341, 43 S.E. 816 (1903).
46. Ibid.
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However, it is the writer's opinion that this case is to be
distinguished from the minority holdings in that the court emphasized that the suit was based on two counts, the first charging a willful tort and the second charging negligence; and the
court made it quite clear that the error in the charge lay only
in the fact that it precluded the plaintiff's recovery for a willful
tort which could have been committed by either defendant.
Impliedly the charge would have been correct in a negligence
action only.
A somewhat stronger case supporting the position that South
Carolina is in the minority is the case of Carson v. Southern Ry.
Co."7 The language of the court appears to be very much in this
direction:
One may be taken and the other left . . . We do not think that8
a verdict in favor of the servants turns the master loose thereby.

But this language must be considered in the light of the cause
of action. It was a suit by a railroad employee for personal injuries and alleged a joint and several tort, caused by the defective couplers used by the railroad and negligence of fellow servants. Under those circumstances it was right for the court to
rule that it was a matter for the jury to decide whose negligence
caused the injury and a verdict for the servants joined as defendants and against the railroad would not be inconsistant.
This case was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United
States.49
Two South Carolina cases which are undoubtedly in accord
with the minority holding holding are Bedenbaugh v. Southern
Ry. Co.5" and Ruddell v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. 5' In both of
these the servant was released and the master held liable; and
the opinions cite the Gardner and Carson decisions as being controlling, without recognizing the distinguishing factors which
led to those decisions.
Although the above two decisions are definitely minority
holdings, South Carolina courts did not continue in this direction. In the case of Sparks v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.52
they reversed the lower court and applied the majority rule. The
action was for wrongful death against the railroad and the conductor who threw the passenger off the train, and the verdict
was for the conductor and against the railroad. On appeal,
47. 68 S.C. 55. 46 S.E. 525 (1903).
48. Id., 46 S.E. at 536.
49. Southern R. Co. v. Carson, 194 U.S. 136, 24 S.Ct. 609, 48 L. Ed. 907
(1904).
50. 69 S.C. 1, 48 S.E. 53 (1904).
51. 75 S.C. 290, 55 S.E. 528 (1906).
52. 104 S.C. 266, 88 S.E. 739 (1916).
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counsel for the plaintiff referred to the above four decisions
as authority, but the court said that the essence of those decisions was that there were other operating agencies of the
principal than the servant sued as joint tortfeasor, and that
is a factor which will be considered shortly. The distinction
must always be made between cases where the only liability
of the master is based solely on the negligence of the servant
joined in the action, and those cases where the master can be
held liable on additional grounds, either his own negligence or
the negligence of other servants not joined. South Carolina
has consistently followed the majority rule in later decisions,
but has been most careful in first determining that the case was
one in which the master was liable only through the negligence
of the servant joined. 3
This determination of the factual question leads to a consideration of the cases applying the second principle mentioned
in the beginning of this comment, that a verdict against the
master alone will not be set aside where there are grounds for
holding him liable other than the alleged negligence of the
servant joined.
But before considering this second main topic it is suggested
that the reader examine two rather unique cases which come
under the first principle.
First is the Mississippi case of St. Lonis & S. F. Ry. Co. v.
Sanderson."4 Here the conductor shot and killed a passenger,
and his widow sued the railroad and "ie conductor. The verdict
was against the railroad only, and on appeal this was affirmed.
The court relied heavily on a Mississippi statute which states
that "one of several appellants shall not be entitled to a judgment of reversal because of an error in the judgment or decree
against another, not affecting his rights in the case.""5 This
decision is peculair to the state of Mississippi.
The second and final case"6 considered in this part of the comment should serve as an example of what not to do in trying a
case. At the trial the attorney for the defendant (who was beSee Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 142 S.C. 125,
(1927): Mullikin v. Southern Bleachery & Print Works,
192 S.E. 665 (1937); Carter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
494, 10 S.E.2d 17 (1940).
54. 99 Miss. 148, 54 So. 885 (1911).
55. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1988 (1942).
56. Jentick v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 18 Cal.2d 117,
(1941).
53.

140 S.E. 443
184 S.C. 449,
Co., 194 S.C.

114 P.2d 343
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ing sued for injuries in a. gas explosion caused solely by the
negligence of his servants) had this to say:
Now, before the jury is sent back, I would like to ask the court
to instruct the jury that it is not necessary to find a verdict against

the individuals Parkhurst and English in order to render a verdict
against the defendant Pacific Gas and Electric Company.Y

After counsel's request, the judge so charged and it took the
jury only five minutes to return a verdict against the company and for the employees. On appeal, the gas company got
some new lawyers and urged that the case be reversed due to
the inconsistency of the verdict. The Supreme Court of California agreed with the contention but refused to reverse on the
doctrine of "invited error."
As to the second principle, the question is purely one of fact.
A verdict for the servant is a determination that he has not
been negligent in the matters charged to him, but this is certainly no reason for relieving the master of liability if the jury
can find from the facts other acts than those committed by
the servant joined on which to base negligence of the master.
If the facts are such that the master himself could have been
negligent or the master had imputed to him the alleged negligence of another servant not joined, the master can be held
liable separately since his negligence was not based solely on
the acts of the employee who was exonerated by the verdict."8
This in effect is what the Georgia Court of Appeals decided
in the case of Moffett v. McCurry, mentioned in the opening
paragraph. The suit was for damages resulting from an accident between plaintiff's car and the defendant's parked truck
after dark. The plaintiff joined the driver, his helper, the carrier and the insurance company. The acts of negligence alleged
were (a) parking on the highway, (b) failure to display clearance lights, (c) parking so that the truck extended across the
center line, (d) failure to have rear reflectors, and (e) failure
to have a red light mounted on the rear of the truck."9 After
a charge in which the lower court told the jury in effect that it
could find against the carrier and insurance company and for the
driver and helper, the jury returned just such a verdict. On
appeal this was held not to be error since the owner could have
been independently negligent in particulars (d) and (e) listed
above.
Judge Felton wrote a strong dissent in which he contended
that the charge constituted reversible error. He reasoned that
57. Id., 114 P.2d at 344.
58. See Note 2, supra.
59. 67 S.E.2d at 811.
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if the owners were guilty of negligence in failing to have rear
reflectors and lights, the drivers were also identically negligent,
saying:
If there were lizhts and reflectors on the truck as to one party.
there had to be lights and reflectors on it as to all parties . . .
There is no act of negligence alleged in this case, whether involving the owner under the rule of respondeat superior, or whether
charging the owner and drivers with identical and coincidental acts
of negligence, of which the owner could be found guilty by the jury
without their also being required to find identical or similar negligence on the part of the drivers.

It is the writer's opinion that the dissent certainly presents
the more appealing view from the standpoint of pure logic and
reason. The charge of the lower court was an unwarranted instruction in view of tie acts of negligence charged, and this
error should have required a reversal on the part of the Court of
Appeals. This seems to be a case where the law of the Harbin
case should have been controlling.
Other cases in Georgia which, on their facts, the courts have
found not to fall under the control of the Harbin case appear
to be on somewhat firmer ground than the Moffett case. In
Finley v. Southern Rv. Co.' Judge Russell pointed out quite
clearly that a verdict for a yardmaster and against the railroad
would be perfectly proper where "the defendant company, as
a tortfeasor, though sued jointly with Hagar and Turner
(yardmasters), might be liable for the negligence of some employee other than they, if, as is alleged in the petition, the negligence of the engineer contributed to the injury."62
Another Georgia case which aptly 3presents the second majority
rule is Southern Ry. v. Garland. Here a wrongful death
action was brought against the railroad, its engineer, and its
fireman, and the jury's verdict was aginst the railroad alone.
Since the petition alleged separate acts of negligence on the
part of the railroad in not having a watchman or warning signal
at a dangerous crossing, in addition to negligence of the engineer
and fireman in the operation of the train, the verdict was al'lowed to stand. The court refused to read into the verdict anything not there, and said that under the evidence such a finding
was not improper and would not be distrubed.
A recent Georgia case illustrating this principle is Reliable
Transfer Co. v. Gabriel.4 It is recommended that this case be
examined closely in the state reports, for it is very complicated
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

67 S.E.2d at 818.
5 Ga. App. 722, 64 S.E. 312 (1909).
Id., 64 S.E. at 315.
76 Ga. App. 729, 47 S.E.2d 93 (1948).
84 Ga. App. 54, 65 S.E.2d 679 (1951).
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on its facts and consists of four different cases and cross-actions.
For present purposes the syllabus by the court is adequate:
Where a suit for damages on account of personal injuries is

brought against a master and his servant, which suit is not based
entirely upon the alleged negligence of the servant within the
scope of his employment, which would be imputable to the master,
but there is other negligence on the part of the master charged
and supported by the evidence, and there is a verdict and judgment
against the master but not against the servant, who is a party to
the action, such verdict and judgment is not void because the jury
did not also find that the servant was negligent as charged or because the jury found that the servant was not negligent."5

The "other negligence" separately charged to the master lay
in permitting its driver to operate for a longer continuous
period than that allowed under the rules of the Georgia Public
Service Commission.
In turning to other jurisdictions, the reader is reminded that
a number of South Carolina cases applying this second rule
when the facts indicated independent negligence attributable
to the master have already been noted."
A typical case is that of Allen v. Southern Ry. Co.,67 decided
in i95o. The separate negligence charged against the railroad
was very similar to that mentioned in the Garland case above,
being the failure to keep the crossing in good repair and erect the
proper signs. A judgment based on a verdict against the railroad and for the engineer was affirmed.
This principle has been applied with such complete unanimity
throughout the various jurisdictions in the United States that
a brief mention of a few cases will amply suffice to illustrate its
meaning.
In two West Virginia cases"6 judgments holding the master
liable while exonerating the servant were affimed since the court
found in each case the master- was negligent independent of
the actions of his servant, in that the injury was a result of
violation of a preemptory and non-delegable statutory duty. The
involved question of what constitutes violation of a non-delegable duty cannot be discussed in this paper. Suffice it to say
that such a violation constitutes independent negligence on the
master's part.
The Supreme Court of Alabama had occasion to apply the
second majority rule in a fairly recent railroad case.69 Suit for
wrongful death caused by permitting a passenger to board the
65. Id., 65 S.E.2d at 681.
66. Cases cited Note 53, supra.
07. 218 S.C. 63, 61 S.E.2d 660 (1950).
68. Wills v. Montfair Gas Coal Co., 104 W.Va. 12, 138 S.E. 749 (1927)
Humphrey v. Virginian Ry. Co ........ W.Va......54 S.E.2d 204 (1948).
69. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Maddox, 236 Ala. 594, 183 So. 849 (1938).
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wrong train was brought against the railroad and the conductor,
and the verdict exonerated the conductor and held the railroad.
On appeal this was affirmed since there was evidence to show
that a flagman, not the conductor, negligently mis-directed the
passenger onto the wrong train, and the master was liable for
this other servant's actions.
To the same effect was a holding of the Minnesota court
in an action against a railroad and the engineer who was absolved." o There was evidence on the trial tending to show negligence on the part of the fireman, and the court charged that "if
either the engineer, McManus, or his fireman were negligent
that would constitute negligence on the part of the defendant
company, but McManus was liable only for his own negligence. '"1 The charge was held to be correct, and the jury's
verdict was properly responsive to it."2
A California case 73 presents a striking factual situation in
which the servant's acquittal gave no relief to the employer.
Little need be said concerning the claim that the verdict in favor
of Blanche Mason is so inconsistent with the verdict against defendant that it cannot be permitted to stand. This rule has been
invoked where the negligence of the employee is the sole and
primary cause of the injury because he alone committed the negligent act. In such a case the liability of the employer is secondary
and he is held accountable solely because of his employee's wrong,
Under such circumstances the verdict in favor of the employee is
inconsistent with the verdict against the employer. . . . Here it
was brought out in the evidence offered by defendant that Mrs.
Mason was not the only employee charged with the duty of keeping the floor clear and free from obstructions. Accordint to her
testimony there were about 160 sales girls charged with the same
duty. The jury might have concluded that one or more of the sales
girls and not Mrs. Mason breached this duty. Under these facts
there was no inconsistency in the verdict, as the primary cause of
the injury was not necessarily the negligence of Mrs.
Mason but
74
might have been the negligence of another employee.

In sustaining a verdict against the truck owner but not the
driver for damages, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania relied heavily on the fact that under the pleadings and proof it
was possible for the jury to find that the accident was caused,
not by any negligence of the driver in the operation of the
truck, but by that of the employer in not having the signal
lights in working condition." With such a device on the truck,
the driver was justified in relying upon it and not employing
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Webster v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 119 Minn. 72, 137 N.W.
168 (1912).
Id., 137 N.W. at 169.
For a very similar case see Stokes v. Wabash R. Co., 355 Mo. 502, 197
S.W.2d 304 (1946).
Wills v. J. J. Newberry Co., 43 Cal. App. 2d 595, 111 P.2d 346 (1941).
Id., 111 P.2d at 349.
East Broad Top Transit Co. v. Flood, 326 Pa. 353, 192 AtI. 401 (1937).
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other means of indicating his intention to turn when the accident happeried.
This brief survey of cases applying the second majority rule
demonstrates that the courts will not fail to sustain a verdict
against the master if there is any negligence attributable to
him other than the alleged negligence of the servant who is
discharged.
On the other hand, it is suggested that where the master
is liable only derivately through negligence attributed to him by
respondeat superior, logic demands that a verdict holding him
liable and absolving the servant charged with negligence be
stricken down. Its inconsistency is rationally repugnant, and such
has been the decision of the great majority of American jurisdictions.
CUBBEDGE SNOW, JR.

